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Abstract:  We examine whether cooperatives are characterized by greater trust than investor-
owned firms.  We survey 2000 Missouri corn and soybean farmers and find that trust and farmer 
perceptions of trustworthiness and competence are higher in cooperatives than in investor-owned 
firms and that trust is a significant factor explaining the choice of farmers to market to 
cooperatives rather than investor-owned firms.  Interestingly, we find that trust is more 
significant in producers’ decisions for marketing soybeans than for corn.  
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Agricultural producer-owned firms (POFs), or cooperatives, occupy a special place in the 
American economic landscape.  Agriculture is one of few sectors of the U.S. economy in which 
cooperative firms directly compete on a large scale with investor-owned agribusiness firms 
(IOFs).  The USDA (2003) reports there were 3,229 agricultural cooperatives in the United 
States in 2001, with membership totaling more than 3 million and producing a net income of 
over $1.35 billion.  As of 1999, 27 percent of total farm marketing (e.g., crops, livestock, and 
poultry) was accounted for by agricultural cooperatives, and 27 percent of all farm inputs (e.g., 
feed, seed, fertilizer, crop protectants, and petroleum) were purchased through cooperatives 
(Kraenzle, 2001). 
Because they are owned by and operated for the benefit of their agricultural producer 
members, POFs have a distinctly different objective and focus than traditional IOFs.  While 
POFs provide financial benefits to the producers with whom they do business, either in the form 
of cost-based pricing, reduced-price services, or patronage refunds, IOFs focus on financial 
returns to (non-producer) investors.  Sykuta and Cook (2001) argue this difference in 
organizational objectives may create greater trust in the relation between producers and 
producer-owned agribusinesses than between producers and IOFs.  Shapira (1999) argues that 
capitalist firms are “low-trust and coercive” while kibbutzim are “high-trust and democratic.”  
Shaffer (1987) asserts that trust makes or breaks a cooperative, in part because the contract 
between producers and the cooperative is more relational in cooperatives than in investor-owned 
  1firms (IOFs) and because cooperatives are generally more reluctant than IOFs to impose 
sanctions on its members. 
  Despite the theoretical arguments, there is little empirical evidence showing that POFs 
are characterized by greater trust than IOFs.  Balbach (1998) examines differences in contracts 
between U.S. sugar beet producers and producer-owned and investor-owned refining companies, 
arguing that the more efficient contracts with cooperatives is attributed to the higher trust 
producers have with the cooperative than with the IOF.  Shapiro (1999) argues that the decline in 
cooperative effectiveness is attributed to the transition from a high-trust to low-trust culture.  In 
these studies trust is implied but not directly measured.   
A 2003 survey of 2,031 U.S. adults conducted by Opinion Research Corporation 
measured the relative degree of trust in cooperatives and IOFs.  The survey revealed that “two-
thirds of consumers believe businesses that are owned and governed by their customers and have 
consumers on their boards of directors are more trustworthy than those that do not” (NCBA, 
2003).  However, this survey examined consumer attitudes only.  In related research, 
Chloupkova, Svendsen and Svendsen (2003) showed how the institutional environment helps 
create and destroy trust within cooperatives, but they did not compare how trust in cooperatives 
is affected vis-à-vis IOFs.  Ole Borgen (2001) showed why trust is important in cooperatives and 
how trust can be generated, but he did not compare trust in cooperatives with that of IOFs.  And 
James and Sykuta (2003) found that agricultural POFs with governance structures more 
resembling those of IOFs exhibit lower levels of organizational trust.  While such studies focus 
on the level of trust within organizations, they don’t address the effect of trust when it comes to 
producers’ choice of doing business with either a POF or an IOF. 
  2The purpose of our paper is to fill the gap in the empirical literature linking trust to 
cooperative (producer-owned) and investor-owned organizations.  We use data from a survey of 
2000 Missouri corn and soybean farmers to examine the relationship between trust and the 
choice of agricultural organization to which farmers marketed their 2002 crop year harvest.  We 
asked farmers whether they marketed their 2002 crops to cooperatives or investor-owned 
agribusinesses.  We also asked about the degree to which they trusted the organizations to which 
they marketed their crops, the terms of the marketing agreement, and other questions about their 
farming practices and experiences.  We find that producers have a higher trust in POFs than in 
IOFs when marketing their soybean crops, but not when marketing their corn harvests.  
 
Background 
Trust is an expectation that one would not be exploited by another (James, 2002).  This 
expectation is based in part on perceptions of the trustworthiness (or honesty) and competence of 
the entities in whom trust is placed (see James, 2002; Levi, 2000; Nooteboom, 2002).  For 
example, consider the case of public support for biotechnology.  If the public is confident that it 
would not be exploited (e.g., the public perceives biotechnology institutions to be trustworthy 
and competent), then the public would be more likely to trust and, in turn, support biotechnology 
institutions. However, if the public expects to be exploited (e.g., public perceptions are that 
biotechnology institutions have a vested interest to misrepresent the safety and efficacy of 
biotechnology or have insufficient knowledge to conduct biotechnology-based research and 
development), then the public would be less willing to trust and hence support biotechnology 
institutions (see Hunt and Frewer, 2001; James, 2003).  
  3There is a growing literature on the relationship between trust and organizations.  Some 
researchers link organizations to the formation and destruction of trust (e.g., Zucker, 1986).  
Other researchers show that trust is a factor affecting organizational form.  For instance, La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) provide evidence that trust is positively 
correlated with the size of firms in an economy.  Simply, trust explains, in part, the existence of 
large firms (see also Fukuyama, 1995).  
At a most basic level, trust is often equated with cooperation, such as in economic models 
of trust (James, 2002).  For instance, La Porta et al (1997, p. 333) state that  
[e]conomists have developed two views of trust as a tendency to cooperate.  One view, 
rooted in repeated game theory, holds that trust is a prior that an opponent is cooperative rather 
than fully rational (e.g., plays only tit-for-tat in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma). … Another view, 
rooted in economic experiments, holds that people cooperate even in one-shot encounters, such 
as the dictator game or the ultimatum game … 
 
If trust is rooted in cooperation, then we might expect that agricultural “cooperatives” – 
by definition – ought to be characterized by trust.  However, whether producer-owned firms 
(POFs) are characterized by greater trust than investor-owned firms (IOFs) is a question that has 
not been fully examined in the literature.  Some researchers have suggested that POFs have 
higher levels of trust than IOFs (e.g., Sykuta and Cook, 2001; Shapira, 1999; Shaffer, 1987).  
However, the evidence is inconclusive.  Although cooperatives are not immune to problems that 
can erode public trust, the fact that cooperatives are governed by the members who patronize 
them might provide important advantages with respect to trust formation, at least compared to 
investor-owned firms.  Thus, we expect that producers will have higher trust in producer-owned 
cooperatives than in IOFs.  To examine the relationship between trust and agricultural 
organization, we follow La Porta et al (1997) who use trust to explain organizations.  In our 
paper we examine whether trust is a factor explaining the decision of producers to market their 
  4crops to POFs or IOFs, holding constant other factors expected to affect that decision, such as 
price received by the organization and the organization’s location.   
 
Data and Methods 
We worked with the Missouri Agricultural Statistics Service (MASS) to implement the 
survey.  MASS drew a sample of 2,000 farmers from the population of Missouri (USA) corn and 
soybean farmers with farms in excess of 50 acres in the USDA farm census.  The survey was 
stratified by size and by USDA reporting district in the state to ensure a statistically 
representative sample.  Surveys were mailed in late February 2003 with a second mailing to non-
respondents in March 2003.  We received 369 responses (142 from the first wave, 227 from the 
second), resulting in an overall response rate of 18.5 percent.
1  This response rate is not unusual 
for surveys mailed to farmers early in the calendar year (see Pennings, Irwin, and Good, 2002).  
Additionally, the only significant difference between first and second wave respondents was that 
first wave respondents were nine percent less likely to be involved in non-farm business 
activities than second wave respondents.  In all other respects the characteristics of first and 
second wave respondents were statistically identical. 
We asked farmers how they marketed their 2002 corn and soybean harvests.  We also 
asked farmers about the extent to which they trusted the organizations to which they marketed 
their harvests, how long they had dealt with the organization to which they sold their 2002 crop, 
whether they earned any off-farm income, and information about their personal and farming 
backgrounds.  
                                                 
1 The surveys were mailed by MASS in University of Missouri envelops, with postage-paid return envelops 
addressed to MASS.  MASS checked off respondents against the original mailing list and forwarded the anonymous 
responses to the authors. 
  5The average farmer in our sample was 58 years old, farmed approximately 750 acres and 
had 34 years of farming experience.  Seventy-nine percent of respondents had a soybean harvest 
in 2002, 61 percent had a corn harvest, and 57 percent harvested both corn and soybeans.  Sixty 
percent did not have any off-farm business activities, while 43 percent utilized only family 
members’ labor during harvest.  Our respondent sample is 94 percent male, 87 percent married, 
and 97 percent Caucasian.  The average yield for soybean farmers in our sample was 33 bushels 
per acre, while the average yield for corn producers was 104 bushels per acre.  Soybean farmers 
in our sample received an average price of $5.38 per bushel for their 2002 crop, while corn 
producers received an average price of $2.35 per bushel.  These yield and price averages are 
consistent with statewide averages for Missouri farmers reported by the Missouri Department of 
Agriculture and the U.S. Department of Agriculture for the 2002 crop year,
2 suggesting that our 
sample is a good representation of Missouri corn and soybean farmers.  See Table 1 for a 
complete listing of variables and their definitions. 
We are interested in examining whether and how trust correlates with the decision of 
farmers to market their 2002 crop to POFs or IOFs, after controlling for other factors we expect 
to influence the marketing decision (such as prices received and distance to the POF or IOF, for 
example).
3  We measure trust (TRUST) by asking farmers to indicate the degree to which they 
agreed with the assessment that the cooperative or agribusiness to which they marketed their 
2002 corn or soybean harvests “would stay within the terms of the agreement.”  Respondents 
indicated by answering definitely agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree, or definitely disagree.   
                                                 
2 According to the 2003 Missouri Farm Facts, the average soybean yield in Missouri in 2002 was 34 bushels per 
acres, with an average price received by farmers of $5.40 per bushel.  For corn producers, the average yield 
statewide in 2002 was 105 bushels per acre, with an average price received of $2.45 per bushel (MODA/USDA, 
2003, pp.5, 64).  
3 Because we are interested in the question of whether trust affects the marketing decision of farmers, we removed 
from our sample those respondents who marketed either corn or soybeans to both a POF and an IOF.  For soybean 
farmers, this resulted in a loss of 10 observations; for corn farmers, this resulted in the loss of 11 observations. 
  6In addition to the trust variable, we also asked farmers about their perceptions of the 
honesty and competence of the POF or IOF to which they marketed their crops, since perceptions 
of honesty and competence are known to affect trust in organizations.
4  We measure perceptions 
of honesty (HONEST) by the question:  “Think about the honesty and integrity of the people in 
the [cooperative or agribusiness] who explained the terms of the contract to you and who paid 
you and took delivery of your grain. Overall, how would you rate the honesty and integrity of 
these people?”  Respondents indicated by answering very high, high, average, low or very low.  
Similarly, perceptions of competence (COMPETENT) were measured by the question:  “Think 
about the competence of the people in the [cooperative or agribusiness] who explained the terms 
of the contract to you and who paid you and took delivery of your grain – their knowledge of the 
industry and your business, their interpersonal skills, their ability to answer your questions, etc. 
Overall, how would you rate the competence of these people?”  Respondents indicated by 
answering very high, high, average, low or very low.   
Because TRUST, HONEST, and COMPETENT are ordinal qualitative variables rather 
than cardinal variables, we employ the transformation procedure outlined by Terza (1987) to 
replace each discrete category (e.g., low, average, high) with a number.
5  If   (where  j d J j ,..., 1 =  
and J is the number of discrete categories) is the discrete category value for variable D, then d  
is replaced with  , where n is the probability density function of the 
j
j j j j j j p n n d / )] ( ) ( [ ˆ
1 1 δ δ − = − −
                                                 
4 For example, Nooteboom (2002, pp. 56, 57) says that organizational trust can be considered by an examination of 
“honesty trust” and “competence trust” in the organization.   
5 Alternatively, we could assign the categories in the variable TRUST, for instance, as Definitely Agree=4, Tend to 
Agree=3, Tend to Disagree=2, and Definitely Disagree=1.  We reject this approach because it assigns an arbitrary 
mean to the variable TRUST (as well as the other qualitative ordinal variables, HONEST and COMPETENT).  See 
Terza (1987) for a discussion. 
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category j, and 
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where   is the inverse of the standard normal cumulative distribution function, and 
1 − N −∞ = 0 δ  
and  +∞ = J δ .  Table 2 gives the transformed values for these variables. 
Because we surveyed farmers after they had made their marketing decisions, trust may 
not be exogenous.  That is, respondents’ perspectives of trust in the organizations to which they 
marketed their crops would likely be affected by their actual experiences with those 
organizations for the crop year in question.  In order to control for that endogeneity, we use 
honesty and competence (a) as independent variables to explain producers’ choice of marketing 
organization, and (b) as instruments of trust in a two-stage specification.
6 
While trust in the organization might be important, we expect other factors to affect the 
decision of farmers to market to either POFs or IOFs.  In this case we control for the price 
offered for the crop and the distance to the agricultural organization.  The variable PRICE is the 
final price, measured in dollars per bushel, received by the farmer at the time of delivery of his 
                                                 
6 In this way we follow the pattern utilized by La Porta et al (1997) who, in addition to linking trust to organization, 
analyzed an assumed instrument of trust (in their case, “hierarchical religion”) as a factor affecting organization.  
  8grain.  The variable DISTANCE is the distance, in miles, the farmer traveled to deliver his 
harvest to the POF or IOF.  We also control for farm and farmer heterogeneity by including the 
following additional variables in our analysis:  The total number of acres that the respondent 
farms (FARMSIZE); whether the farmer had above-average farming experience 
(FARMEXPERIENCE); whether the respondent was not involved in any off-farm business 
activities (FARMONLY); whether the respondent had exclusively family members (such as 
spouse, children, siblings, parents, cousins, etc) help with their 2002 crop harvest, either as paid 




  Tables 3 and 4 list summary statistics for our sample of respondents.  According to Table 
3, approximately 33 percent of soybean farmers marketed their 2002 soybean harvests to 
producer-owned firms (POFs).  Additionally, over 70 percent of soybean farmers also planted 
corn in 2002.  In contrast, Table 4 shows that only 26.6 percent of corn farmers marketed to 
cooperatives and nearly all corn farmers (93 percent) also farmed soybeans.   
With respect to the question of trust, Table 3 shows that for soybean farmers the mean of 
TRUST in producer-owned firms is significantly greater (p=0.04 in a difference of means test) 
than the mean of TRUST for investor-owned firms.  Similarly, the mean values for HONEST 
and COMPETENT are greater for POFs than for IOFs (p=0.02 and p=0.15, respectively).  This 
suggests that soybean farmers place significantly more trust in POFs than IOFs and that they 
perceive POFs to be characterized by significantly greater levels of honesty and competence than 
IOFs.  Additionally, in comparison to farmers who marketed their soybean crops to 
  9agribusinesses, soybean farmers marketing to cooperatives received a lower price for their crop, 
traveled a shorter distance to deliver their harvest, had smaller farms, were more likely to have 
above-average farming experience, were less likely to rely exclusive on family to help with 
harvest, and were older.
7  In all other respects the differences between farmers marketing to 
POFs and IOFs were not significantly different. 
  Interestingly, Table 4 provides a different picture from the perspective of corn growers, 
with respect to perceptions of trust in POFs and IOFs.  In the case of the variable TRUST, there 
is virtually no difference between trust in POFs and trust in IOFs.  Average perceptions of 
honesty (HONEST) are slightly larger in cooperatives than in agribusinesses, but not 
significantly so (p=0.26).  Farmers perceive cooperatives to be more competent (COMPETENT) 
than IOFs, but only weakly so (p=0.14).  This suggests that corn growers do not consider POFs 
and IOFs to differ in terms of their trustworthiness.  However, there are important differences in 
the characteristics of corn farmers who market to POFs rather than IOFs.  Farmers selling their 
corn to cooperatives instead of IOFs received a lower price for their crop, traveled a shorter 
distance for delivery, had smaller farms, were more likely to be involved in off-farm business 
activities, were more likely to have attended at least some college, and were older.
8  
  The differences in trust in POFs and IOFs can also be observed from an examination of 
the biserial correlations between measures of trust and choice of POF and correlations between 
trust, honesty and competence variables.
9  As seen in Table 5, TRUST, HONEST and 
COMPETENT are significantly correlated with POF (the decision of soybean farmers to market 
their grain to a cooperative).  However, in the case of corn growers, no measure of trust is 
                                                 
7 In a difference of means test, the differences noted here are significant at the 10 percent level or better. 
8 In a difference of means test, the differences noted here are significant at the 10 percent level or better. 
9 A biserial correlation measures the correlation between a dichotomous variable (e.g., POF) and a continuous 
variable (e.g., Trust).  
  10correlated with POF.  Importantly, HONEST and COMPETENT are highly correlated with 
TRUST, providing prima facie evidence that perceptions of honesty and competence are good 
indicators of trust.  Indeed, the relationship between perceptions of honesty and competence and 
trust exists for both corn and soybean farmers.   
  Tables 6 and 7 present results from a Probit analysis of the effects of trust and other 
variables on the marketing decisions of farmers.  Although the coefficient itself in a Probit model 
is not directly interpretable in terms of the magnitude of the effect in the probability a farmer 
marketing to a POF, it is possible to calculate the change in probability, given a unit change in 
the respective variable, by looking at the estimated coefficient times the density function of the 
standard normal distribution evaluated at the fitted value of the regression (see Greene, 2000, ch. 
19). 
  In Table 6 we present results of our analysis of soybean farmers.  We find that TRUST, 
as well as HONEST and COMPETENT, are highly correlated with POFs.  Specifically, TRUST 
increases the probability that a soybean farmer will market his crop to a POF by 10.5 percent, 
even after controlling for other factors expected to affect the decision of farmers to market their 
crop to a POF.  Controlling for the expected endogeneity of trust by examining perceptions of 
honesty and competence as independent variables, we find that the variables HONEST and 
COMPETENT each improve the likelihood of a farmer marketing to a POF by nine and eight 
percent, respectively.  We also use HONEST and COMPETENT as instruments in a two-stage 
model in which predicted values of trust (TRUST_HAT) from the first-stage regression are used 
in a second-stage Probit model.  We find that the impact of trust not only remains significant but 
also increase in importance, in that trust increases the likelihood that farmers market their 
soybeans to POFs by 19 percent. 
  11  Although trust and perceptions of honesty and competence in the organization to which a 
farmer markets his crop are important in the marketing decision, they are not the most important 
factors, according to our analysis.  The most important factor, according to our data, is price.  
The fact that IOFs offer farmers a higher price for their soybean harvest than POFs reduces the 
likelihood that soybean farmers will market their crop to a POF by nearly 32 percent.
10  This 
might explain why more than two-thirds of soybean farmers in our sample marketed their 2002 
harvest to IOFs. We also find distance is a significant factor affecting the marketing decision of 
soybean farmers.  The greater the distance to the organization, the less likely the farmer will 
market to a POF, other things being equal.  Stated differently, farmers appear to be more willing 
to travel a greater distance to an IOF than to a POF. 
  Table 7 presents a different picture of the effect of trust on the decision of corn producers 
to market their crop to POFs.  We find that trust is not significantly correlated with the POF or 
IOF decision of corn farmers, even after controlling for expected endogeneity by examining the 
effects of perceived honesty and competence and by using perceptions of honesty and 
competence as instruments of trust.  Instead, as in the case of soybean farmers, price is the most 
important factor.  The fact that IOFs offer a higher price for corn, on average, reduces the 
likelihood that farmers will market to a POF by nearly 57 percent.  The next most significant and 
                                                 
10 We note that one reason the price variable is negative and significant is that producer-owned firms generally 
return revenue to producers in the form of a patronage refund.  Therefore, some farmers might be willing to accept a 
lower price for their crop from a POF in anticipation of receiving a patronage refund from the POF.  However, the 
fact that the price and distance variables are significant might indicate that the expected patronage refund is not 
sufficient to induce some farmers to market to a POF.  If the expected patronage refund were sufficient to make up 
the difference between the POF and IOF price, then the PRICE variable would not be expected to be significant.  
That is, at the margin, farmers would be indifferent between marketing to a POF and IOF, if the patronage refund 
paid by the POF was expected to “make up the difference” between the IOF and POF prices.  We believe the 
relationship among patronage refund, price paid and other factors on the marketing decision of farmers is an 
important problem that deserves further research. 
  12important factor is distance.  The further a POF is from a farmer, the less likely he is to market 
his corn there.  
 
Discussion 
  We find that farmers marketing soybeans place significantly higher trust in POFs than 
IOFs and that trust is a significant factor affecting the decision of soybean farmers to market 
their grain to a POF, other things being equal.  However, while trust matters for soybean 
producers, the relationship between trust and agricultural organization does not appear to be the 
same for corn farmers.  We find that trust is not different between POFs and IOF for corn 
farmers.  We offer two possible explanations for this finding. 
  First, as seen in Tables 3 and 4, while a little more than two-thirds of corn farmers also 
grow soybeans, nearly all soybean farmers grow corn.  Moreover, more than two-thirds of 
soybean farmers marketed their crop to IOFs.  Thus, it is possible that the decision farmers are 
making with respect to the marketing of soybeans is a driver for the corn marketing decision and 
that the marketing decision of corn farmers may not be independent enough from the soybean 
decision for us to adequately capture the effect of trust on choice of marketing organizations 
from a corn farmer perspective.  For example, for the subset of farmers growing both corn and 
soybeans, 71.62 percent of farmers marketing their soybeans to a POF also marketed their corn 
to a POF.  In contrast, only 8.82 percent of farmers marketing their soybeans to an IOF market 
their corn to a POF.  Additional evidence for the fact that soybeans might be influencing the 
marketing of corn comes from the fact that the SOY variable in Table 7 is negative and large, 
although it is not statistically significant.  Nevertheless, the negative sign might indicate that the 
  13soybean decision has an important (and negative) effect on the marketing decision of corn 
farmers. 
  Second, the fact that nearly all corn producers also planted soybeans might indicate a 
desire on the part of some corn producers for greater diversification, which could, in turn, 
indicate a lower tolerance for risk than soybean producers.  Because “uncertainty and 
vulnerability are the core elements of trust relations” (Heimer, 2001, p. 43), farmers who are 
relatively more averse to risk than others might also be less willing to trust, or at least be less 
willing to impute trust in the organization to which they market their harvests.  
 
Conclusion 
  Our results present an interesting puzzle concerning the nature of producers’ relationships 
with the organizations to which they market their crops.  The literatures on collective 
organizations and on trust both suggest that agricultural producers would have higher trust in 
producer-owned marketing organizations than in investor-owned firms.  Our results suggest that 
while such a trust relationship appears to exist in soybean marketing relationships, it is not 
evidenced in corn marketing relationships.  The puzzle is why such a difference would exist 
between the two products.  As noted above, one possibility is that the choice of organization for 
marketing soybeans also dictates the choice for marketing corn when a farmer produces both 
products.  Another is that corn producers appear more likely to diversify their crop products (by 
also growing soybeans) more than soybean producers, perhaps exhibiting a higher degree of risk 
aversion or a higher perceived uncertainty, both of which would be negatively correlated with 
trust.  Other explanations may exist as well, such as whether the products will be used for local 
versus distant end consumer markets (e.g., for a local feed mill versus for export).  We hope to 
  14explore these and other possible differences that may explain the puzzle and provide a better 
understanding of the formation and role of trust in producers’ marketing decisions. 
  15Table 1.  Variable names and definitions. 
 
Variable Definition 
POF  Dummy variable equal to one if respondent marketed his 2002 crops to a producer-owned firm 
(cooperative); equal to zero if 2002 crops marketed to an agribusiness. 
TRUST Qualitative  response variable based on respondent’s agreement with the statement that the 
cooperative or agribusiness would stay within the terms of the agreement, where response options 
are Definitely Agree, Tend to Agree, Tend to Disagree, or Definitely Disagree. 
HONEST  Qualitative response variable based on respondent’s assessment of the honesty and integrity of the 
people within the cooperative or agribusiness who explained contract terms, took delivery of the 
crop, and paid the farmer, where response options are Very High, High, Average, Low, and Very 
Low. 
COMPETENT  Qualitative response variable based on respondent’s assessment of the competence (such as 
knowledge of industry and interpersonal skills) of the people within the cooperative or 
agribusiness who explained contract terms, took delivery of the crop, and paid the farmer, where 
response options are Very High, High, Average, Low, and Very Low. 
PRICE  Price received by respondent for 2002 crop at time of delivery. 
DISTANCE  Distance, in miles, from respondent’s farm to cooperative or agribusiness where delivery of 2002 
crop occurred. 
FARMSIZE  Number of acres farmed by respondent. 
FARMEXP  Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent had above-average number of years farming 
experience.  
FARMONLY  Dummy variable equal to one of respondent was not involved in any off-farm business ventures or 
occupations in 2002. 
FAMILYHELP  Dummy variable equal to one if only family members helped the respondent with the 2002 crop 
harvest. 
COLLEGE  Dummy variable equal to one if respondent attended at least some college. 
MARRIED  Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent was married. 
AGE Respondent’s  age. 
CORN  Dummy variable equal to one if soybean producers also planted corn in 2002. 
SOY  Dummy variable equal to one if corn farmers also planted soybeans in 2002. 
 
  16Table 2.  Terza (1987) transformation values for trust, honesty and competence variables. 
 
Variable  Ordinal Response Category 
Terza (1987) Transformed Cardinal Value 





Tend to Agree 
-0.9089 
Tend to Disagree 
-2.3564 
Definitely Disagree 






























Tend to Agree 
-1.0154 
Tend to Disagree 
-2.4610 
Definitely Disagree 




























  17Table 3.  Summary statistics for soybean producers. 
 
  All Soybean Growers    Soybean Growers Marketing to POFs    Soybean Growers Marketing to IOFs 
Variable                             Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max
POF  0.326  0.470                  0 1 1  0 
TRUST  0.000  0.813                     
                     
                     
                    
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
-2.874 0.651 0.173  0.725 -0.909 0.651 -0.096  0.846 -2.874 0.651
HONEST  0.000  0.908 -2.874 1.004 0.216  0.827 -1.305 1.004 -0.135  0.934 -2.874 1.004
COMPETENT  0.000  0.918 -2.586 1.157 0.135  0.863 -1.184 1.157 -0.077  0.943 -2.586 1.157
PRICE  5.38  0.436 2.50 6.18 5.20  0.528 2.50 6.18 5.47  0.348 4.50 6.12
DISTANCE  23.1  27.298 1 212 10.6  10.607 1 60 30.3  31.110 1 212
FARMSIZE  838.4  926.0 50 5800 642.5  740.1 50 5500 933.7  991.6 50 5800
FARMYEARS  34.7  13.910 6 67 35.4  15.270 6 67 34.4  13.231 7 65
FARMEXP  0.514  0.501 0 1 0.587  0.495 0 1 0.479  0.501 0 1
FARMONLY  0.635  0.482 0 1 0.571  0.498 0 1 0.667  0.473 0 1
FAMILYHELP  0.440  0.497 0 1 0.359  0.482 0 1 0.479  0.501 0 1
COLLEGE  0.472  0.500 0 1 0.489  0.503 0 1 0.463  0.500 0 1
MARRIED  0.876  0.330 0 1 0.837  0.371 0 1 0.895  0.308 0 1
AGE  58.2  12.710 26 86 60.5  13.195 31 86 57.0  12.348 26 86
CORN  0.716  0.452 0 1 0.717  0.453 0 1 0.716  0.452 0 1
 
  18Table 4.  Summary statistics for corn producers. 
 
  All Corn Growers    Corn Growers Marketing to POFs    Corn Growers Marketing to IOFs 
Variable                             Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max
POF  0.266  0.443                  0 1 1  0 
TRUST  0.000  0.797                     
                     
                     
                    
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
-2.461 0.546 -0.030  0.887 -2.461 0.546 0.018  0.744 -1.015 0.546
HONEST  0.000  0.915 -2.731 1.078 0.115  0.931 -2.243 1.078 -0.078  0.902 -2.731 1.078
COMPETENT  0.000  0.920 -2.699 1.159 0.157  0.917 -1.066 1.159 -0.102  0.913 -2.699 1.159
PRICE  2.35  0.249 1.45 2.90 2.26  0.235 1.60 2.70 2.40  0.244 1.45 2.90
DISTANCE  20.4  21.754 1 108 9.8  8.399 2 60 27.0  24.742 1 108
FARMSIZE  903.8  966.090 48 5800 665.9  863.404 50 5500 990.2  989.226 50 5800
FARMYEARS  33.7  13.724 7 67 35.9  16.156 8 67 33.1  12.705 7 65
FARMEXP  0.467  0.500 0 1 0.544  0.503 0 1 0.440  0.498 0 1
FARMONLY  0.671  0.471 0 1 0.571  0.499 0 1 0.708  0.456 0 1
FAMILYHELP  0.458  0.499 0 1 0.439  0.501 0 1 0.465  0.500 0 1
COLLEGE  0.463  0.500 0 1 0.561  0.501 0 1 0.427  0.496 0 1
MARRIED  0.883  0.322 0 1 0.860  0.350 0 1 0.892  0.312 0 1
AGE  56.7  13.098 26 86 60.6  14.097 32 86 55.3  12.454 26 86
SOY  0.930  0.256 0 1 0.947  0.225 0 1 0.924  0.267 0 1
 
 
  19Table 5.  Correlation coefficients between measures of trust and farmer’s decision to market 





Variable POF  TRUST  HONEST  COMPETENT 
  Soybean Growers 














HONEST     1.000  0.790
 a 
(0.000) 
COMPETENT       1.000 
  Corn Growers 












HONEST     1.000  0.824
 a 
(0.000) 
COMPETENT       1.000 
a significant at 1%, 
b significant at 5%, 
c significant at 10% 
 
  20Table 6.  Probit analysis of farmer decision to market 2002 soybean harvest to producer-owned firms 
(POFs) rather than investor-owned firms (IOFs). 
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a significant at 1%, 
b significant at 5%, 
c significant at 10% 
Standard errors in parentheses.  Estimated slope in brackets, calculated by multiplying coefficient with average density. 
  21Table 7.  Probit analysis of farmer decision to market 2002 corn harvest to producer-owned firms 
(POFs) rather than investor-owned firms (IOFs). 
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a significant at 1%, 
b significant at 5%, 
c significant at 10% 
Standard errors in parentheses.  Estimated slope in brackets, calculated by multiplying coefficient with average density.
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